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Abstract 
Though it is often claimed that bilateral tax treaties promote foreign direct investment 
(FDI), previous empirical studies do not support this view. Using U.S. FDI outflows 
disaggregated into financing modes, equity, reinvested earnings, and inter-company 
debt, we estimate fixed-effects quantile regression models that include controls for new, 
existing-renegotiated tax treaties, and the total number of tax treaties a host country has 
in effect. Results, in general, indicate that U.S. bilateral tax treaties have a negative 
impact on total U.S. FDI outflows, equity capital, and reinvested earnings and a positive 
and significant impact on inter-company debt, while the total number of treaties a host 
countries has in place has a positive and statistically significant impact on total U.S. FDI 
flows, reinvested earnings, and equity capital to the host country. In addition, a full set 
of time controls also allows us to explore a policy anticipation effect and passage of the 
2004 American Jobs Creation Act (AJCA). Results are consistent with a policy-
anticipation effect in 2004 and actual policy effect in 2005 in which retained earnings 
and total FDI were, all other things constant, statistically significantly larger in 2004 and 
smaller in 2005. These controls are not statistically significant in the models for equity 
capital or inter-company debt.  
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Tax Treaties, Tax Holidays, and U.S. Foreign Direct Investment Financing Modes 
 
According to the United Nations Council on Trade and Development (UNCTAD 2011), 
there are over 6,100 treaties of one form or other governing bilateral investment 
relationships.  Included in these treaties are over 2,500 bilateral tax treaties or double-
tax treaties which are arguably the most pervasive international legal agreements on 
foreign investment and form the basis for the international tax regime. Reuven (2009) 
claims that, though they differ across countries, nearly all bilateral tax treaties are based 
on models dating back to the League of Nations.  
 As discussed in studies such Egger et al. (2006), Blonigen and Davies (2004) and 
Davies et al. (2009), bilateral tax treaties contain elements that may encourage foreign 
direct investment (FDI) and elements that may discourage FDI. One of the well-known 
positive aspects of a tax treaty is the assignment of tax jurisdiction which provides relief 
from double taxation. Standardization of tax rules also encourages FDI by reducing 
withholding rates and tax uncertainty.  Rules on transfer pricing, in contrast, allow for 
increased information sharing and enforcement of price calculation guidelines and may 
reduce FDI flows between partner countries. Likewise, agreements on limiting treaty 
provision to the residents of the partner countries (by establishing limits on third-
country residents’ ownership) are intended to reduce treaty shopping and may reduce 
FDI. 
 Regarding treaty shopping, Davies (2004) describes the ‘multilateral” aspect of 
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bilateral tax treaties. That is, how a bilateral treaty may have a third-country effect of 
distorting or diverting investment flows or how networks of bilateral treaties create 
complexities which make it difficult to determine where tax credits should be applied. 
Because tax treaties differ across country pairs, managers of multinational firms can 
practice “treaty shopping,” and invest in a third country that offers a lower withholding 
rate to the host country. Hence, third country effects are magnified by the transfer 
pricing opportunities available to multinationals that operate in many countries.      
 Because of their opposing effects, the net effect of bilateral tax treaties on FDI is 
an empirical issue.  In general, the existing and limited empirical literature finds little or 
no evidence that the signing of a bilateral tax treaty spurs new FDI, or weak evidence in 
support of a negative impact. In this study we use aggregate U.S. FDI outflows, but 
disaggregate the flow data into its three financing modes: equity capital, retained 
earnings, and inter-company debt. We view our contribution to the literature in three 
ways.  
 First, we examine how tax treaties might affect the different modes of financing 
in addition to aggregate flows. Second, we accommodate the distribution of the data by 
employing quantile regressions models as suggested by Millimet and Kumas (2007). 
We, however, use fixed-effects quantile-regression models to account for potential 
country-pair fixed effects, while including separate controls for new treaty countries 
(negotiated within the sample period), existing and renegotiated treaty countries, and 
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no treaty countries rather than pooling any two groups or dropping a group. Third we 
consider potential multilateral effects by including a control for the total number of 
treaties a host country has in place during a given year. Our models also allow us to 
consider the tax holiday included in the 2005 American Jobs Creation Act. These last 
two issues, to our knowledge, have not yet been considered in the empirical literature. 
In addition, we take advantage of new and expanded data that includes not only a 
longer time span than the data employed in earlier studies of tax treaties, but also a 
larger number of countries with new or in-sample treaties or with no treaty.  
 Our empirical results indicate that the total number of tax treaties a host country 
has in place has a statistically significant and positive impact on total U.S. FDI outflows 
and all three financing modes. In contrast, total FDI outflows, equity-financed FDI 
outflows, and retained earnings show a negative and statistically significant association 
with new and existing-renegotiated tax treaties. Further results for existing-renegotiated 
treaties point to a positive and statistically significant impact on inter-company debt 
while new treaties show a positive but statistically insignificant impact.  
We offer as an explanation that, on the one hand, the positive multilateral effect 
measured by the total number of treaties is consistent with a treaty-shopping effect in 
which a host country with a large number of bilateral treaties facilitates income shifting 
by multinational firms for tax minimization purposes. On the other hand, new and 
renegotiated U.S. bilateral tax treaties enhance tax cooperation, information sharing, 
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and rules to reduce tax avoidance and outweigh positive aspects of the treaties thereby 
reducing both equity-financed FDI and reinvested earnings. Indeed Dagan (2000) 
argues that tax treaties are not even needed to eliminate double-taxation and are really 
used to simplify and coordinate taxation and redistribute tax revenues from developing 
to developed nations. Hence, our results are consistent with Davies observation that 
there exists a “mismatch” between the framing of tax treaties and how they are used in 
practice. 
 Results for a 2004 time control shows statistically significant results that are 
consistent with an anticipated policy (tax holiday) effect in which retained earnings 
were larger for that year, all other things considered. Results for the 2005 time controls 
display statistically significant results consistent with an actual policy effect in that 
earnings retained abroad we lower in 2005. As one would expect, these statistically 
significant positive-negative effects are also reflected in total FDI outflows but not in 
equity-financed FDI or intercompany debt.   
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a review 
of the literature on taxes and FDI and tax treaties and FDI. Section 3 describes the 
pattern of U.S. FDI flows, modes of financing FDI, and our research hypotheses. Section 
4 describes the data and empirical methodology. Section 5 provides the results of the 
empirical models while Section 6 offers a conclusion. 
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2. Tax Treaties, and Foreign Direct Investment 
2.2 Tax treaties, FDI, and Financing Modes 
Reuven (2009) provides an excellent history and overview of the design and 
implementation of bilateral tax treaties, while Davies (2004) offers a review of the 
theoretical and empirical literature on tax treaties, in particular contrasting the 
conventional view that tax treaties are designed to increase FDI with the empirical 
evidence in the literature that shows otherwise. He points out that tax treaties may 
increase FDI through several different channels: elimination of double taxation through 
credits or exemptions, tax coordination, coordination of tax definitions and jurisdiction, 
which reduce tax uncertainty. However, tax treaties are also designed to promote 
information sharing between policymakers in the host and source country and setting 
standards for transfer pricing policies thereby reducing tax evasion and treaty shopping 
and may actually reduce FDI.  
 Blonigen and Davies (2000) offer the first empirical study of the impact of tax 
treaties on FDI. Focusing on U.S. FDI inflows and outflows, a dummy variable for a 
bilateral tax treaty implied a strong positive and significant effect, leading to the 
conclusion that tax treaties promote FDI. The authors note that the effects of a treaty 
may change over time and so they include an age or “vintage” variable reflecting the 
length of time the treaty has been in place. This variable was positive and significant, 
leading them to conclude that tax treaties have a positive impact on FDI that increases 
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over time.   
Blonigen and Davies (2004), take issue with two aspects of their earlier study. 
First, the earlier analysis used a single dummy variable for tax treaties. Some countries 
in the sample had treaties existing prior to the sample period whiles others did not. 
Those with existing treaties tend to be the largest recipients of U.S. FDI flows and the 
largest source countries for FDI into the United States. Hence, the dummy variable may 
actually be reflecting differences of unobserved country characteristics between 
existing-treaty countries and new-treaty countries. Second, when FDI is measured in 
levels, new treaties were found to be significant and positive, while when measured in 
logs, they were not. The authors argue that because logging the dependent variable 
helps with the inherent skewness of the data, the analysis should be completed in log 
form.     
 Blonigen and Davies (2005) uses a similar approach but considers FDI flows of a 
group of OECD countries from 1982 through 1992. Using a single dummy variable for 
tax treaties they once again find a positive and significant effect on FDI stocks. 
However, when separating old and new treaties, they find a positive and significant 
effect for old treaties but a negative and significant effect for new treaties when the 
dependent variable is in levels and for new treaties a negative but insignificant effect 
when the dependent variable is in logs. 
 Davies (2004, p. 784) offers possible explanations for the lack of a consistent 
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significant effect of treaty variable in their empirical studies: FDI may be affected by 
factors other than government tax policies and the data may be too “noisy to tease out 
the positive effect of tax treaties” or that the way treaties are used in practice may be 
different than their potential as agued by theorists.  
 Davies (2003) considers the renegotiation of the old treaties using U.S. FDI data 
on stocks from 1966 to 2000, and affiliate sales and flows from 1983 to 2000. Controlling 
for country-fixed effects precludes using separate old and new treaty dummy variables 
as the old treaty dummy is time invariant. Hence, he includes a pooled-treaty variable 
and a dummy variable to reflect treaty renegotiation. He finds that the pooled treaty 
variable is negative and significant. The renegotiation variable is negative but not 
significant for stocks but positive and significant for sales and flows. He speculates that 
the differing sample period of the data for stocks versus flows is one reason for the 
difference. Restricting stocks to 1983 through 2000, he finds renegotiated treaties to be 
positive but insignificant. He offers additional explanations that it may take stocks a 
longer time to adjust to the renegotiated treaty than required by flows, there may be an 
endogeneity issue (large sales induce renegotiation), and that firms may be adjusting to 
decreased withholding rates by shifting and maintaining more income abroad. 
Egger et al. (2006) emphasize the second suggestion of Davies, tax treaties are 
also bilateral agreements to share information and establish rules on transfer pricing 
and tax shopping so as to reduce tax avoidance and evasion and, thus, may actually 
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reduce FDI activity. By emphasizing these two major objectives of double taxation and 
tax avoidance, it is unclear whether these agreements promote or reduce FDI activity. 
Specifying a theoretical model and using numerical simulations they conclude that 
certain combinations of country characteristics determine the welfare effects of tax 
treaties and, therefore, the implementation of new treaties should be considered 
endogenous. Examining a group of OECD countries over the period from 1985 to 2000 
and controlling for the potential endogeneity they find a significant negative effect for 
new treaties. 
Following this, Barthel et al. (2009) use a large data set of bilateral FDI 
relationships to consider the impact of tax treaties on FDI stocks. Their estimates result 
from a fixed-effects model which, as explained above, eliminates the control for existing 
treaties. Again the benefit of this approach is that it eliminates the potential endogeniety 
of the existing treaties variable with the latent country-specific characteristics. The 
remaining tax treaty dummy variable then captures treaties negotiated during the 
sample period. Using stock data, they also include a variable for the age of the treaty to 
capture the impact of the treaty over time.  Both variables are positive and significant 
with the treaty-age effect only “slightly higher” than the new-treaty effect. The authors 
attribute the positive and robust results to a larger sample of countries and longer time 
period. 
 Most recently, Blonigen et al. (2012) and Davies et al. (2009) use firm-level data to 
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explore the opposing effects tax treaties have on the intensive margin (the level of FDI 
flows as measured by affiliate sales) and extensive margin (the probability of new 
investment). Davies et al. find that the implementation of a new tax treaty has no effect 
on the level of FDI but does have a positive impact on the probability of investment. 
Blonigen et al. find that the positive effect of new tax treaties is reduced or reversed as 
the price transparency of inputs sold by the affiliate to the parent increases, thereby 
limiting income shifting via transfer pricing.  
Though we are also interested in how tax treaties might affect FDI, in contrast to 
previous studies our main interest is in how these policies affect the mode of financing 
FDI. In other words, we are not just interested in whether these policies affect aggregate 
FDI flows, but also if they affect the way in which firms finance FDI.1  Specifically we 
test if these international policies affect not only the attractiveness of FDI but also the 
profit or income shifting of firms and, hence, will be evident in individual financing 
modes but not necessarily in aggregate flows. The data used here, therefore, differs in 
two important ways: First, our sample cover a longer time span and runs from 1982 
through 2007, over years when there were much more significant FDI flows. Second, the 
data is disaggregated into its three different financing modes. The next section describes 
the data on U.S. FDI outflows and offers our research hypotheses.  
                                                          
1 Related to the work here, Wolff (2007) analyzes, in four separate models, total FDI flows and the three 
financing modes, finding that the different components of FDI respond differently to taxation as well as 
other explanatory variables used in the model. He finds that taxes are insignificant in the models for total 
FDI flows and equity financing but significant for reinvested earnings and debt. 
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3. Describing Patterns of U.S. FDI Flows and their Financing Patterns 
Although little work has been done on modeling the financing modes of FDI, a notable 
exception is Lipsey (1993) who compares financing flows across U.S. inward and 
outward FDI from 1950 through 1991.  He finds that U.S. firms tend to finance FDI 
abroad more consistently through reinvested earnings whereas foreign firms have a 
more varied pattern of financing. Lipsey however does not use a formal model of any 
kind to explain the asymmetry he finds. Furthermore, the Lipsey comparison is 
problematic in the sense that he relates U.S. MNE financing patterns in many different 
countries to that of foreign MNEs operating only in the United States. As such, it is 
difficult to identify whether the differences noted are driven by the uniqueness of U.S. 
MNE strategies, or by host country characteristics. For example, it may be the case that 
given the United States is a highly developed economy, with well-developed legal and 
financial institutions, a more varied set of financing options emerge. On the other hand, 
to the extent U.S. MNEs are operating in many different economies, with varied levels 
of institutional and legal development, this may lead to a relatively large reliance on 
retained earnings.  
3.1 U.S. FDI Flows and Financing  
The U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) categorizes U.S. FDI flows into three 
financing modes; equity capital, reinvested earnings, and inter-company debt. In regard 
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to outflows specifically, the BEA defines each type of flow as follows: A positive equity-
capital outflow occurs when a U.S. parent company increases its equity investment in 
one of its existing foreign affiliates or makes a new equity investment in a foreign 
business enterprise, either by acquiring an existing business or establishing a new one. 
A negative equity capital outflow occurs when a U.S. parent company reduces its equity 
investment in one of its existing foreign affiliates.  
 Inter-company debt flows are of two types, U.S. parent receivables and U.S. 
parent payables.  U.S. parent receivables represent loans that a U.S. parent extends to its 
foreign affiliate.  A positive U.S. parent receivable occurs when the U.S. parent extends 
a new loan to its foreign affiliate. A negative parent receivable occurs when an affiliate 
repays part or all of a loan from its U.S. parent. A U.S. parent payable represents loans 
that a foreign affiliate extends to its U.S. parent. A positive U.S. parent payable occurs 
when the parent repays part or its entire loan from its foreign affiliate and a negative 
parent payable occurs when an affiliate extends a new loan to the U.S. parent.  
 Reinvested earnings are the parent’s claim on undistributed after-tax earnings of 
its foreign affiliate. They are computed as the difference between the parent’s claim on 
its affiliate’s current earnings and the dividends that the affiliate pays to a parent 
during a given period. A positive reinvested earning outflow occurs when a parent has 
a claim on positive current earnings of its affiliate in excess of the dividends that it 
receives from its affiliate. A negative reinvested earning outflow occurs when these 
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claims on earnings are repatriated to the parent. Because each of these flows contain 
both positive and negative outflows, the net outflow can be positive, negative, or zero 
in any given period.  
 Managers of MNEs, therefore, can rely on any or all of the three financing modes 
as options for financing FDI. Razin, Sadka, and Yuen (1998) describe a “pecking” order 
among these international capital flows. Relying on corporate financial theory in which 
firms prefer internal financial modes, such as retained earnings first and inter-company 
debt second, over other external modes such as equity finance, they extend this notion 
to international finance flows by considering FDI as retained earnings capital flows, and 
separate portfolio flows into equity modes and debt modes. They demonstrate this 
pattern, or pecking order, in global flows (though their focus is specifically on 
developing countries).  
 Daniels, Hejazi, and von der Ruhr (2004) consider the pattern of U.S. FDI 
outflows disaggregated into the three financing modes over the period 1982 through 
2000 and divide the data both by host country or region and by industry. They also 
show a similar pecking order in the data in that reinvested earnings are the most 
important source of financing for U.S. MNEs operating abroad. They show this to be the 
case both at country or region levels and industry levels. Furthermore, they find that 
reinvested earnings are more important regionally than globally both in aggregate and 
at industry levels. However, they also point out that although equity financing is less 
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important as a source of financing for U.S. MNEs operating abroad than is reinvested 
earnings, it is more important than inter-company debt. 
 The data used in the analysis here is from the same source as Daniels et al., but is 
extended to include a larger number of countries and a longer time period.2 Hence, 
Figures 1 through 3 show the same general pattern with reinvested earnings being the 
most important financing mode. This holds in aggregate as shown in Figure 1, for 
countries with which the U.S. has a tax treaty in place, as shown in Figure 2, and across 
developed and developing host countries, as shown in Figure 3. All three figures also 
show that though reinvested earnings are more important than equity finance, equity is 
more important than inter-company debt. With an understanding of the existing 
literature and the pattern of data, we next offer our research hypotheses.  
Figures 1 through 3 Here 
3.2 The American Jobs Creation Act 
Though the 2004 AJCA initially began as a bill to compensate exporters for the repeal of 
the tax-based export subsidy, it quickly grew to include many tax breaks. One provision 
was a tax break or tax holiday offered to corporations for repatriation of foreign-earned 
income. In this provision, for the year 2005 only, U.S. multinationals paid a 5.25 percent 
tax rate on foreign source income (the statutory U.S. corporate tax rate was and is 35 
percent). In order to receive this credit, firms were required to submit a proposal on 
                                                          
2 Since their study, the BEA has extended the number of countries included in the FDI outflow database 
disaggregated to the country level. 
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how the repatriated earnings would be used to undertake specific domestic investment 
projects.  Hence, this tax holiday was enacted to incentivize firms to permanently 
reinvest income earned abroad domestically in effort to promote job growth. Because 
2004 was an election year, the bill was trumpeted throughout the year and so was 
anticipated early in the year, before eventually being signed by both the house and 
senate in October.  
As a result, the approach used here is to view the act as both an anticipated 
policy action and an actual policy action. We expect that because the policy was 
anticipated, firms would tend to hoard foreign profits until 2005 and, hence, reinvested 
earnings would rise. Because reinvested earnings are the biggest component of FDI 
outflows, it may cause overall flows to rise as well. We do not a priori expect this policy 
to have an impact on equity or debt. One might argue, however, that if this policy 
action led managers to believe that such holidays would now be the norm as opposed 
to the exception, this would spur new FDI and also increase equity flows and inter-
company debt.    
For 2005 we expect the opposite as firms would repatriate earnings under the 
lower tax and so reinvested earnings and possibly total flows would decline. Again we 
have no a priori expectations for equity or debt. Our hypotheses, therefore, is that the 
2004 dummy variable will be positive for total flows and reinvested earnings and the 
2005 dummy variable will be negative for total flows and reinvested earnings.  
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3.3 New Tax Treaties 
If, on the one hand, tax treaties promote FDI, then we should expect their effect on total 
flows and the three components of financing to be positive. It is unclear, a priori, which 
mode would be most elastic to the policy change and which the least elastic. If, on the 
other hand, treaties primarily serve to coordinate tax policy, set rules for transfer 
pricing and reduce tax evasion and treaty shopping, then they could well reduce FDI. 
Though this might reduce the transfer of new funds and be reflected in a decline in 
equity financing, we expect the biggest impact on retained earnings and debt as it 
would affect income shifting described in the review of the tax studies above. 
Given the work cited above, one should treat those countries with treaties 
existing prior to the sample period separately from those countries that negotiated a 
treaty during the sample period. The majority of the countries with new treaties are 
emerging or developing countries. Those with existing treaties are developed 
economies and all of the treaties were negotiated prior to 1957. Hence, because of 
differing country characteristics, the net effect of the dual objectives in the tax treaties 
may not necessarily have a similar impact on FDI flows to the two groups of countries. 
Because reinvested earnings are the most important financing mode for U.S. 
multinationals, we expect their biggest impact to be on the reinvested earnings of U.S. 
multinationals and be reflected in overall flows as well. In short, the impact of old and 
new treaties is an empirical question likely to be reflected in retained earnings flows.  
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
16 
 
3.4 Existing-Renegotiated Treaties 
In our sample there are 22 countries with treaties in place prior to 1982, 15 with treaties 
completed during the sample period, 1982 through 2008, and 16 countries with no 
treaty in place. There are 17 of the 22 countries with existing treaties who renegotiated 
the tax treaty. Some treaties were renegotiated prior to the start of our sample period 
and some after (4 prior to 1982 and the remainder after 1982). Table 1 provides a list of 
all the countries in the study, the date the tax treaty came into force, and the date of a 
renegotiation of the treaty. 
 The renegotiated treaties updated the old treaties in a number of different ways. 
The most important were conditions to reduce treaty shopping and revisions on the 
treatment of branch profits versus subsidiary profits in line with the 1986 U.S. tax 
revision. In addition, for some of these countries the withholding rates and dividends 
on direct investment changed. 
The renegotiated treaties also had an impact on the taxation of dividends of 
direct investment in countries including Switzerland, Ireland, and Italy. Most countries 
tax dividends on direct investment at a lower rate (typically 5 percent) than dividends 
on portfolio investment (typically 15 percent). However, the definition of direct versus 
portfolio investment can vary across countries. In these three countries there had to be a 
95 percent ownership share to be considered direct investment. The renegotiation 
reduced that threshold to the standard 10 percent threshold in both Switzerland and 
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Ireland. For Italy, it was reduced from 95 percent to 50 percent to qualify for the 5 
percent tax rate, and between 10 percent and 50 percent for a 10 percent tax rate. 
Therefore, as with new treaties, the net effect of the renegotiation of existing treaties is 
an empirical question. Our approach to coding the existing-renegotiated treaties is 
described in the next section. 
 Of course, managers of firms face a number of different choices beyond the 
foreign entry modes of exporting or FDI. Indeed the 2011 UNCTAD World Investment 
Report focuses on the growing importance of non-equity modes (NEM) of international 
production. UNCTAD defines NEM as alternatives to taking ownership share of a 
foreign entity, such as franchising, licensing, outsourcing, and so on. Though our focus 
is how tax treaties and tax holidays might affect U.S. FDI outflows and the financing of 
those flows, we do not intend to minimize the importance of other global strategies. In 
the next section, we describe both our empirical approach and the data in much more 
detail.  
 
4. Data and Empirical Methodology 
To explore the role of tax treaties and the tax holiday of the 2004 AJCA, we employ a 
standard model that includes explanatory variables suggested by the existing literature 
on FDI (see Bonigen 2005 in particular). Our empirical analysis considers aggregate or 
total U.S. FDI outflows and outflows separated into their three financing modes.  
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4.1 Data Description 
Our dependent variable is U.S. FDI outflows and is from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis. The sample period is driven by data availability and covers the period of 1982 
through 2007. (We do not include 2008 to 2010 because of the potential impact of the 
global financial crisis on FDI patterns.) All models include as an independent variable 
the lag of the log of real U.S. FDI stocks in the host country to capture FDI dynamics 
and agglomeration effects. Stocks are converted to real values using the Nonresidential 
Gross Private Domestic Investment Deflator. The FDI data and deflator are from the 
BEA and consist of annual observations for the 53 countries listed in Table 1.  
 Independent variables also include the lag of real GDP, the log of the host 
country’s population, trade openness expressed as the total of exports and imports as a 
percentage of GDP, financial openness measured by capital inflows as a percentage of 
GDP, and domestic credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP which serves as a 
measure of the financial depth of the host economy. Size similarity is measured 
following Egger and Pfaffermayr (2004) using GDP data. The log of the sum of phone 
(land-line) subscriptions and mobile phone subscriptions per 100 people is used to 
capture information capabilities of the host economy. All of these variables are taken 
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. 
 All models also include the log of the real exchange rate between the dollar and 
the currency of the host country (expressed as U.S. dollar/host currency so that an 
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increase in its value indicates a real appreciation of the host country currency against 
the U.S. dollar) and is calculated using the annual average exchange value and CPI data 
from the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics. The host 
country’s statutory corporate tax rate is used as a measure of tax difference across 
countries and changes in taxes over time.3  
 Time-varying dummy variables for bilateral investment treaties, trade 
agreements, and NAFTA are included, and are derived from information at the U.S. 
Trade Compliance Center. We code bilateral trade agreements separate from NAFTA as 
bilateral agreements may not have the same impact on U.S. FDI as a regional 
agreement.  
 The key independent variables of our analysis include a dummy variable for new 
(enacted during the sample period) tax treaties coded with the value of 1 when a treaty 
is in place and 0 otherwise. To code the existing-renegotiated treaties (existing prior to 
the sample period) we follow Allee and Peinhardt’s (2010) treatment of investment 
treaties in an empirical model. Hence, existing treaties are assigned a value of 1 and 
when renegotiated a value of 2 thereby creating a control that varies over time. This 
approach is consistent with the fact that the existing treaties are improved and updated 
rather than replaced. Using these two variables for new and old-renegotiated treaties, 
                                                          
3 It would be preferred to also include effective tax rates but they are not available for the broad set of 
countries in this study. The statutory tax rates were kindly provided by the Center for Global and 
Economic Studies and PricewaterHouseCoopers and are available from the authors by email. 
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leaving “no treaty” as the omitted category, we are able to distinguish between various 
groups of countries and their treaty status. Note that previous studies either pooled the 
different groups or only considered new treaty countries. Treaty information can be 
found in Table 1 and is derived from information available on the website of the U.S. 
Internal Revenue Service.  
 A count variable is used to code the number of treaties that a host country has in 
place in any given year and is derived from the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD) database on country-specific double-taxation treaties. 
Finally, given that we are exploring panel data, all models include year controls. In 
order to consider the impact of the AJCA, we consider the controls specific to 2004 and 
2005. Table 2 provides summary statistics for all variables prior to their transformation.  
4.2 Empirical Model: The Problem of Negative FDI Flows 
As described earlier, the four FDI flow measures are net flows of capital, which can 
assume either a positive or negative value. To understand how a FDI outflow measure 
can be either positive or negative first consider an equity capital increase which reflects 
an additional capital contribution to an existing affiliate, an acquisition of an existing 
entity, or the establishment of a new affiliate.  Second, decreases in equity capital also 
occur when a U.S. parent partially or fully liquidates or sells a previously established 
affiliate, or simply returns or borrows capital from an affiliate, all of which can be 
referred to as capital repatriation.  
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 Typically aggregate total outward investment flows are positive for a given year. 
However, for a specific country during a given year, a decrease in equity capital 
position can exceed an increase in equity capital position resulting in a negative net 
value. In 2006, for example, the total U.S. outward direct investment flow was positive. 
However, for Canada in specific, capital decreases or capital repatriation exceeded 
capital increases resulting in a negative flow value.  
 These negative values create a problem as the variable of interest cannot be 
logged. Most often researchers base their analysis on the level of flows (see for example 
Wolff 2007). In other cases, various transformations of the data are proposed. Some 
authors set the negative values to some minimum positive value (for example Blonigen 
and Davies, 2004, who use the value of 0.1) and then log the flow measure. Blonigen 
and Davies argue for this approach as FDI flows tend to be skewed.  
 Others treat the negative observations as missing or set at zero and employ a 
truncated-data approach, such as a Tobit model (see for example Razin and Sadka, 
2007). Rationalizing this later approach, Razin and Sadka argue that instances of capital 
repatriation (the negative observations) are related to past positive outflows and not 
current positive outflows. This indeed may be the case, but capital repatriation decisions 
may also hinge upon changes in contemporaneous costs associated with producing 
abroad, contemporaneous business conditions, or policy actions or even anticipated 
policy actions (which is our interest here), that could well be the variable of interest in 
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the model. Furthermore, this approach implicitly assumes that the negative 
observations represent only the return of capital outflows and no new outflows (which 
rejects the possibility that new outflows are occurring as in the case of Canada given 
above). 
Treating negative values as missing is unacceptable as negative occurrences may 
be systematic (and thus should not be treated as non-systematic missing values) and 
implicitly assuming that there are no new acquisitions. Examining the individual 
financing modes illustrates that caution should be exercised in the treatment of negative 
values. On the other hand, the other transformations described above do not treat 
negative and positive values symmetrically (reducing the monotonicity of the variable) 
and can result in biased or inconsistent estimates.4 Alternative transformations – such as 
the neglog transformation suggested by Whittaker, Whitehead, and Somers (2005) 
which do treat negative and positive values symmetrically – when applied to FDI data 
that is peaked near zero and has long tails, results in a bimodal distribution and require 
nonparametric approaches.  
Because these approaches are less than satisfactory, some researchers avoid using 
flow data and opt for stock data. Of course this approach is fine, but one would expect 
stocks to react rather slowly to some variables, such as changes in transportation costs, 
making it difficult to flesh out the impact of these variables on FDI. For some studies, 
                                                          
4 The extent of the bias is proportional to the share of the sample that is screened or truncated. See 
Greene(2003) for an explanation and Coe et al. (2007) for a discussion relating to trade data. 
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like the one here, stock data is not available for some measures (such as the various 
financing modes) and so this last approach is not an option. 
 As mentioned above, kurtosis is another problem with FDI data but is not often 
discussed in the literature on FDI flows. The prevalence of extreme values in total flows 
and the disaggregated flows leads to a peaked distribution with very long tails 
(common in financial data).  Hence, a mean estimation approach on the level of flows is 
not likely to be robust to these extreme values and results may be misleading.  
 Our empirical strategy is to take a nonparametric approach and use a quantile 
regression estimator. (See Yu, Lu and Stander, 2003, for a discussion on applications of 
quantile regression.) This approach is motivated by Millimet and Kumas (2008) who 
consider U.S. FDI data covering the period examined by Blonigen and Davies (2004). 
They find that the effects of new treaties are not homogeneous over the distribution and 
argue (p. 11) that “…the distinction between levels and logs appears to be primarily and 
artifact of the focus on the (condition) mean effect of tax treaties.” 
 Though novel in the FDI literature, the approach of Millimet and Kumas has a 
shortcoming as pointed out by Egger et al. (2006) in that treaty implementation may be a 
“self-selection” event. This means that the treaty variable may be correlated with the 
latent country-specific characteristic which, in this application, is the unobserved 
propensity of U.S. firms to FDI to a given country. This problem would require a fixed-
effects model approach. Indeed a Hausman test on standard random-effects models 
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versus fixed-effects models which include all variables described above for total and 
disaggregated flows reject a random effects model. Therefore, we settle on a pooled-
quantile regression model with fixed-effects by following Canay (2011) and Wooldridge 
(2010) using bootstrapped errors to compare results across the conditional quantiles.5  
  
5. Results 
Tables 4 through 7 provide results for the mean and quantile regressions on total FDI 
flows, retained earnings, equity capital, and inter-company debt respectively. The 
estimates of the lag of the real stock, real GDP, credit, and NAFTA on total FDI flows 
are positive and statistically significant and have a greater impact at the 0.90 quantile 
than at the median. Trade openness is positive and significant for values in the middle 
quantiles. Size similarity and population are negative and statistically significant and 
the estimates are not statistically significantly different across quantiles. The real 
exchange rate is negative and statistically significant implying that a real appreciation 
of the host country’s currency is associated with smaller FDI flows. This effect is larger 
in magnitude in the lower quantiles, which would include net negative flows to the 
country. These results are very similar in the models for reinvested earnings, except for 
population which is not statistically significant. The similarity is not surprising, given 
that, as explained earlier, retained earnings are the most important mode of FDI 
                                                          
5 Our data and STATA do files are available upon request. 
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outflows for U.S. firms and so the outcome for reinvested earnings is reflected in total 
flows. 
The models for equity capital show some differential results from those for total 
flows. Real GDP is negative and statistically significant. The corporate tax rate is 
negative and statistically significant for the middle quantiles. Trade openness is 
significant only for the top quantiles and NAFTA is not statistically significant.  
The models for intercompany debt provide the most heterogeneous results. Real 
FDI stocks, size similarity, credit, and the real exchange rate are all statistically 
significant and of the opposite sign as the results for total flows and reinvested 
earnings. Trade agreement is positive and statistically significant across the entire 
distribution of data. 
5.1 Results for New, Old-Renegotiated, and Total Number of Treaties  
Figures 4 through 7 illustrate the estimated treaty effects across total FDI flows and the 
three financing modes. Results for the new treaty control show a negative and 
statistically significant relationship with total FDI flows, reinvested earnings, and equity 
capital. Evaluated at the median to quantify this effect, a new tax treaty reduces U.S. 
FDI outflows to the host country by approximately $7 million. As shown in Figure 4, the 
negative impact of a new treaty is increasing across the distribution of total flows. A 
similar pattern for reinvested earnings and equity capital is evident in Figures 5 and 6. 
The new treaty control is not statistically significant in the inter-company debt model. 
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 The old-renegotiated treaty control is also negative and statistically significant in 
the models for total FDI flows, reinvested earnings, and equity capital. (Note in Table 5, 
the estimated coefficient in the fixed-effects mean regression has a p-value of 0.055.) A 
pattern where the variable is significant for all but the largest quantile is consistent 
across all three of these flows. As displayed in Figures 4 through 6, in general the 
negative impact of old-renegotiated treaties is diminishing across the distribution of 
these flows. In contrast, the impact of an old-renegotiated treaty on inter-company debt 
is positive and statistically significant with the estimated effect increasing across the 
distribution of debt flows as shown in Figure 7.  
 Evaluated at the median, an old-renegotiated treaty reduces U.S. FDI outflows to 
the host country by approximately $3 million. This rather modest effect is due to the 
differential impact across the three financing modes. Viewing Tables 5 through 7 and 
again evaluating at the median, an old-renegotiated treaty has a relative small negative 
effect on reinvested earnings, a large negative effect on equity capital and a relatively 
large positive impact on inter-company debt.   
 The count variable for total number of tax treaties in place in the host country is 
positive and statistically significant across the entire distribution of total FDI flows, 
reinvested earnings, and equity capital. Though the control is positive for inter-
company debt, it is significant only around the median value. Figures 4 through 6 show 
that the impact of the total number of treaties is increasing across the distribution of 
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these three flows. Evaluated at the median, the economic significance is rather modest 
at approximately $0.4 million for total FDI flows, $0.3 for reinvested earnings, and $1.1 
million for equity capital. It is important to note, however, that these estimates reflect 
the impact of the host country increasing the total number of tax treaties it has with 
other countries on just U.S. FDI flows to the host. In aggregate (or considering beyond 
U.S. flows alone) this effect could be quite substantial.  
 What we take from this is that tax cooperation, information sharing, and 
agreements on treatment of activities such as transfer pricing are the most important 
aspects of new treaties and the renegotiation of existing treaties. As such, all other 
things held constant, bilateral tax policies affect the attractiveness of new FDI and lead 
to changes in the management of overseas earnings. Hence, the effects of these policies 
are not homogenous across the types of financing modes. The total number of tax 
treaties a host country has in place may allow multinationals to treaty shop and pay 
lower withholding taxes when repatriating earnings from the network of treaty 
countries to the host country. It may also offer greater clarity on how earnings made 
abroad will be taxed by the host. (For a specific example, see the recent discussion on 
the number of tax treaties and the attractiveness of operating in the Netherlands in the 
Financial Times, 2013.)  
5.2 Results for 2004 and 2005 Controls 
We consider the estimated coefficients on the 2004 and 2005 year controls to evaluate 
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the potential for an anticipated and actual policy effect form the passage of the AJCA. 
Of course the sign and magnitude of these coefficients and the model constant is 
dependent on the selection of the omitted year, which by default we leave at 1982. 
Therefore we gauge the effect by viewing the significance and magnitude relative to the 
other year controls.  
 The 2004 control is statistically significant in the models for total FDI flows and 
reinvested earnings. In both models it is the largest value among all the year controls. It 
is neither significant nor the largest value for equity capital and inter-company debt. 
The 2005 control is statistically significant in the models for total FDI flows and 
reinvested earnings. In both models it is the largest negative value among all the year 
controls and statistically significantly different from the next largest negative value. It is 
neither significant nor the largest negative value for equity capital and inter-company 
debt.  
 These results are consistent with an anticipated policy effect increasing the net 
retained earnings of U.S. multinationals in 2004 and an actual policy effect of reducing 
net retained earnings in 2005. Because retained earnings are the most important mode 
of FDI outflows for U.S. multinationals, the impact on retained earnings is also reflected 
in total flows.  
5.3 Robustness Test 
The results for reinvested earnings, equity capital, and inter-company debt are based on 
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individual regression equations. Of course managers of multinational firms and select 
among these different modes of financing or combine these modes. Hence, the three 
types of flows, in aggregate net flows may not be independent.  For each type of flow 
we use the fixed-effects (within) estimator on the models (which do not include time-
invariant variables), with a full set of period controls and standard errors robust to 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, to obtain estimates of the unit-specific residuals.  
These residuals are then incorporated into each equation to estimate a seemingly 
unrelated regression (SUR). These results are then compared and contrasted with the 
estimates of the fixed-effects mean regressions provided in Tables 5 through 7. (See 
Blackwell 2005 for a presentation on estimating multiple-equation fixed-effects panel-
data equations.)  
 Individual coefficients and standard errors for the key variables of interest are 
only slightly different. (For the sake of space they are not reported here but are available 
upon request.) Nonetheless, there are no changes in sign or significant for any of the 
treaty variables. In addition to a robustness check, the SUR model allows us to compare 
estimates across equations. Post-regression hypothesis tests indicate the following. For 
new treaties we are unable to reject the null that there is a statistically significant 
difference between the estimated coefficient for reinvested earnings and equity capital. 
For old-renegotiated treaties and the total number of treaties we find that the absolute 
value of the estimated coefficients for equity capital are statistically significantly larger 
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than for reinvested earnings.      
 
6. Conclusion 
The origins of current bilateral tax treaties can be traced back to the League of Nations 
and continue to be negotiated today. With over 2,500 such treaties in place, they form 
the basis for the legal framework governing international investment flows. By their 
nature, these treaties have two primary objectives; the avoidance of double taxation, 
and the prevention of tax evasion and fraud. Though typically promoted as a policy to 
spur new FDI flows, the dual nature of bilateral tax treaties may provide incentives for 
multinationals to increase or decrease FDI activity. 
 In general, empirical studies do not provide robust conclusions for old treaties, 
mixed evidence that new treaties have a negative effect, and limited evidence that 
renegotiated treaties have a positive effect. Davies (2004 p. 784) notes this “dearth of 
significant evidence” and suggests that the potential uses of tax treaties discussed by 
theorists may be quite different from their use in practice.  
 Nonetheless, international tax policies are an important and controversial policy 
issue and may well be consequential to the FDI decisions of managers of multinational 
firms. Here we consider the impact of tax treaties and the 2005 AJCA tax holiday on 
U.S. FDI outflows. We argue that these polices may well have differential impacts on 
how firms finance acquisitions and their decisions on retaining profits abroad and, 
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therefore, may not be evident in aggregated flows. 
 Regression results indicate that anticipation of the passage of the American Jobs 
Creation Act led to an increase in outflows of reinvested earnings while the tax break it 
offered in 2005 lead to a decrease. Results for tax treaties indicate that new treaties have 
a negative and statistically significant impact on total FDI flows, reinvested earnings, 
and equity capital but are not significant for inter-company debt. Old-renegotiated 
treaties have a negative impact on total FDI flows, reinvested earnings, and equity 
capital and a positive impact on inter-company debt. The total number of treaties a host 
country has in place has a positive and statistically significant impact on total FDI flows, 
reinvested earnings, and equity capital but not for inter-company debt. We offer as a 
possible explanation that tax avoidance is the most important contribution of new 
treaties while reduced withholdings and reductions in taxes on direct investment 
dividends are the most important contributions of new treaties.  
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Figure 1: Total U.S. FDI Outflows    Figure 2: U.S. FDI Outflows by Treaty 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: U.S. FDI Outflows By Developed/Developing 
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Figure 4: Treaty Results for Total FDI Flows
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Figure 5: Treaty Results for Reinvested Earnings
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Figure 6: Treaty Results for Equity Capital 
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Figure 7: Treaty Results for Inter-Company Debt
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Table 1:  U.S. BILATERAL TAX AGREEMENTS 
 
 Country Date of Tax Treaty1 #2  Country Date of Tax Treaty1 #2 
1 Argentina NA 37 28 Japan 1954 (1971) 51 
2 Australia 1953 (1982) 44 29 Korea 1980 68 
3 Austria 1956 (1996)  75 30 Luxembourg 19634 54 
4 Belgium 1948 (1970)  86 31 Malaysia NA 62 
5 Brazil NA 33 32 Mexico 1994 36 
6 Canada 1941 (1980) 87 33 Netherlands 1949 (1992) 92 
7 Chile NA 23 34 New Zealand 1948 (1982) 32 
8 Columbia NA 4 35 Nigeria NA 14 
9 Costa Rica NA 4 36 Norway 1951 (1971) 92 
10 China 1987 87 37 Panama NA 5 
11 Czech Republic 1993 70 38 Peru NA 6 
12 Denmark 1948 (2000) 90 39 Philippines 1983 39 
13 Ecuador NA 9 40 Poland 1974 82 
14 Egypt 19823 47 41 Portugal 1994 53 
15 Finland 1952 (1989) 67 42 Russia 1994 65 
16 France 1940 (1994) 107 43 Saudi Arabia NA 12 
17 Germany 1954 (1989) 81 44 Singapore NA 63 
18 Greece 1950 45 45 South Africa 1998 55 
19 Guatemala NA 0 46 Spain 1991 76 
20 Honduras NA 1 47 Sweden 1940 (1994) 90 
21 Hong Kong NA 13 48 Switzerland 1951 (1996) 90 
22 Hungary 1979 61 49 Thailand 1998 60 
23 India 1991 69 50 Turkey 1997 71 
24 Indonesia 1990 53 51 UAE NA 43 
25 Ireland 1952 (1997) 45 52 United Kingdom 1945 (1975) 110 
26 Israel 1995 44 53 Venezuela 2000 25 
27 Italy 1955 (1984) 81     
1 Renegotiated treaty in parentheses. 
2 Number of treaties in place in 2007. 
3 Came into force the first year of the sample and treated as a new treaty. 
4 Renegotiated but not ratified. Treated as a country with an existing treaty not renegotiated. 
Source:  U.S. Internal Revenue Service, www.irs.gov/business/international/ 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics, 1982 – 2007 
Variable   Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations  
Real Total Stock Overall 17422.67   39853.65   -396.096   403575.2   N =    1293  
  Between   28758  219.1515  157314.8  n =      53  
  Within     27105.64   -110311   317379.9   T = 24.40  
Total Flows Overall 1681.23   5272.50   -19284.00   109097.00   N =    1279  
  Between   2745.15  -5.50  14838.50  n =      53  
  Within     4465.86   -28657.30   99723.70   T = 24.13  
Equity Overall 789.87   3335.14   -7390.00   67724.00   N =    1032  
  Between   1554.04  -137.55  10107.42  n =      53  
  Within     2848.84   -8969.56   63606.41   T = 19.47  
Reinvested Overall 856.57   2605.41   -33848.00   35679.00   N =    1301  
  Between   1226.72  -143.62  5848.04  n =      53  
  Within     2289.49   -38839.47   30687.53   T = 24.55  
Debt Overall 178.85   2000.97   -17828.00   18139.00   N =    1028  
  Between   265.66  -68.28  1439.69  n =      53  
  Within     1980.11   -17802.15   16878.15   T = 19.40  
Real GDP Growth Overall 2.19  3.87  -23.35  16.24  N =   1352  
 Between   1.75  -1.75  9.14  n =     53  
  Within   3.46  -19.41  18.14  T = 25.51  
Financial Openness Overall 5.89  33.38  -14.92  564.92  N =    1345  
 Between   22.87  0.08  168.40  n =      53  
 Within   24.25  -153.67  402.40  T = 25.38  
Population Overall 75000  201000  365.5  1320000  N =    1378  
(thousands) Between   202000  410.2697  1180000  n =      53  
  Within   22300  -130000  276000   T =      26  
Trade Openness Overall 0.80   0.64   0.12   4.38   N =    1355  
  Between   0.61  0.20  3.52  n =      53  
  Within     0.19   -0.21   2.13   T =  25.57  
Credit to Private Overall 65.84   44.65   8.33   231.08   N =    1347  
 Sector Between   39.76  13.59  188.20  n =      53  
  Within     21.61   -9.56   190.39   T = 25.41  
Top Corporate Tax Overall 33.83   9.54   8.50   68.25   N =    1305  
  Between   6.32  11.68  50.34  n =      53  
  Within     7.13   7.75   58.98   T = 24.62  
Real Exchange Rate Overall 0.36   0.43   0.00   2.72   N =    1356  
  Between   0.35  0.00  1.58  n =      53  
  Within     0.25   -0.08   2.69   T = 25.58  
Phone Subs. Overall 49.61   47.87   0.19   214.80   N =    1378  
  Between   30.17  3.26  103.77  n =      53  
  Within     37.39   -13.33   201.36   T =      26  
Investment Treaty Overall 0.09   0.29   0   1   N =    1378  
Trade Agreement Overall 0.04   0.20   0   1   N =    1378  
NAFTA Overall 0.02   0.14   0   1   N =    1378  
New Treaty Overall 0.17  0.37  0  1  N =    1378  
Old/Reneg. Treaty Overall 0.66  0.84  0  2  N =    1378  
Total # of Treaties Overall 33.33  26.41  0  110  N =    1378  
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Table 3: Additional Summary Statistics on Dependent Variables 
1982 – 2007 
 
Variable  Percentile Value Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Obs.  
Total Flows Mean 1681.234  5272.469  9.1488  150.7042  1279  
  0.10 -126          
 0.25 32          
 0.50 287          
 0.75 1223          
 0.90 4126          
Equity Mean 789.8672  3335.135  11.0321  179.6157  1032  
  0.10 -215          
 0.25 0          
 0.50 65          
 0.75 418          
 0.90 1553          
Reinvested Earnings Mean 865.5696  2605.407  3.1657  71.7436  1301  
 0.10 -70          
 0.25 30          
 0.50 191          
 0.75 732          
 0.90 1981          
Debt Mean 178.8473  2000.973  0.9257  37.4989  1028  
 0.10 -480          
  0.25 -119          
  0.50 13          
 0.75 235          
 0.90 1009          
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Table 4: Fixed-Effects Mean Regression 
and Fixed-Effects Quantile Regression Results for Total Flows, 1982-2007 
  
Mean 
 0.10  
Quantile 
 0.25  
Quantile 
 
Median 
 0.75  
Quantile 
 0.90  
Quantile 
 
Explanatory Variable             
Real Stock (lag) 551.619 *** -33.033 
 
225.784 *** 344.565 *** 489.176 *** 733.624 *** 
 
(132.520) 
 
(112.831) 
 
(64.265) 
 
(52.408) 
 
(63.533) 
 
(97.635) 
 Real GDP (lag) 849.172 
 
981.616 ** 552.495 ** 619.178 *** 812.032 *** 841.589 ** 
 
(463.126) 
 
(331.655) 
 
(212.371) 
 
(186.567) 
 
(178.927) 
 
(300.899) 
 Size Similarity -48184.4 *** -49780.9 *** -48035.7 *** -48655 *** -49856.979 *** -49145.7 *** 
 
(2817.703) 
 
(2311.493) 
 
(1519.673) 
 
(1191.622) 
 
(1411.405) 
 
(2099.576) 
 Population -3465.78 *** -3268.88 *** -2918.46 *** -2951.42 *** -3226.308 *** -3487.05 *** 
 
(429.577) 
 
(296.831) 
 
(188.444) 
 
(189.312) 
 
(198.812) 
 
(319.747) 
 FDI Openness 17.098 *** 10.964 
 
9.024 
 
18.205 
 
39.977 *** 36.075 *** 
 
(3.819) 
 
(10.798) 
 
(7.666) 
 
(11.968) 
 
(10.713) 
 
(8.096) 
 Trade Openness 391.662 
 
472.487 
 
632.433 *** 712.244 *** 370.736 * -82.103 
 
 
(265.983) 
 
(286.814) 
 
(158.435) 
 
(144.132) 
 
(167.240) 
 
(229.841) 
 Credit 23.535 *** 16.755 *** 17.753 *** 18.433 *** 24.145 *** 29.413 *** 
 
(3.746) 
 
(2.772) 
 
(2.169) 
 
(1.882) 
 
(2.765) 
 
(4.233) 
 Top Corp. Tax -1678.22 
 
-607.287 
 
-1330.93 
 
-1913.38 * -1529.509 * -979.306 
 
 
(1654.538) 
 
(715.705) 
 
(767.617) 
 
(791.547) 
 
(767.163) 
 
(918.418) 
 Real Exchange Rate -533.998 *** -539.551 *** -514.398 *** -494.479 *** -485.89 *** -459.206 *** 
 
(54.220) 
 
(23.313) 
 
(22.925) 
 
(18.709) 
 
(25.628) 
 
(32.522) 
 Phone Total -544.523 
 
-137.9 
 
82.209 
 
-0.876 
 
-318.59 * -615.852 * 
 
(281.756) 
 
(192.433) 
 
(149.885) 
 
(130.077) 
 
(146.888) 
 
(251.730) 
 Investment Treaty -216.934 
 
-499.529 
 
-131.919 
 
-6.925 
 
-219.277 
 
61.905 
 
 
(479.970) 
 
(260.988) 
 
(263.838) 
 
(155.257) 
 
(152.944) 
 
(248.994) 
 Trade Agreement -453.736 
 
-152.771 
 
-663.665 ** -917.483 * -319.56 
 
-427.021 
 
 
(644.811) 
 
(239.678) 
 
(226.019) 
 
(456.507) 
 
(377.693) 
 
(507.824) 
 NAFTA 5102.042 *** 3434.585 
 
4016.512 *** 5272.185 *** 5847.462 *** 6598.269 ** 
 
(920.811) 
 
(2218.577) 
 
(680.827) 
 
(913.669) 
 
(995.230) 
 
(2537.396) 
 New Treaty -2287.31 *** -1477.82 *** -1789.92 *** -1966.29 *** -2241.77 *** -2533.52 *** 
 
(419.207) 
 
(333.897) 
 
(251.217) 
 
(190.718) 
 
(193.186) 
 
(283.297) 
 Old/Renegotiated Treaty -976.091 *** -1031.51 ** -743.171 *** -766.276 *** -652.373 *** -409.176 
 
 
(263.926) 
 
(323.886) 
 
(145.340) 
 
(136.302) 
 
(145.908) 
 
(213.613) 
 Total # of Tax Treaties 135.824 *** 96.634 *** 110.879 *** 121.068 *** 133.08 *** 144.427 *** 
 
(8.375) 
 
(10.336) 
 
(5.035) 
 
(4.777) 
 
(6.001) 
 
(8.837) 
 Constant 36209.51 *** 29035.82 *** 32778.06 *** 31641.76 *** 31887.289 *** 34197.1 *** 
 
(6370.736) 
 
(4235.956) 
 
(2883.613) 
 
(2331.394) 
 
(2178.647) 
 
(3261.136) 
 R2 – pseudo R2 0.804 
 
0.758 
 
0.755 
 
0.754 
 
0.719 
 
0.690 
 N 1179  1179  1179  1179  1179  1179  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
       Fixed-Effects mean estimator robust standard errors in parentheses. Fixed-Effects quantile regression estimates and 
 standard errors, in parentheses, were obtained via bootstrapping with 100repetitions. 
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Table 5: Fixed-Effects Mean Regression 
and Fixed-Effects Quantile Regression Results for Reinvested Earnings, 1982-2007 
  
Mean 
 0.10  
Quantile 
 0.25  
Quantile 
 
Median 
 0.75  
Quantile 
 0.90  
Quantile 
 
Explanatory Variable             
Real Stock (lag) 415.738 *** 197.761 *** 266.991 *** 328.528 *** 397.221 *** 535.331 *** 
 
(66.745) 
 
(39.187) 
 
(26.435) 
 
(25.058) 
 
(32.467) 
 
(38.122) 
 Real GDP (lag) 599.227 * 418.723 * 512.174 *** 512.182 *** 684.873 *** 565.769 *** 
 
(233.981) 
 
(169.490) 
 
(102.138) 
 
(84.217) 
 
(120.092) 
 
(163.197) 
 Size Similarity -19725.9 *** -20011.8 *** -20721.1 *** -19949 *** -20254.9 *** -19499.7 *** 
 
(1424.952) 
 
(898.978) 
 
(559.269) 
 
(613.435) 
 
(727.590) 
 
(1047.441) 
 Population -152.421 
 
87.744 
 
100.817 
 
22.909 
 
-220.115 
 
-282.488 
 
 
(216.854) 
 
(147.423) 
 
(85.032) 
 
(90.501) 
 
(124.941) 
 
(165.213) 
 FDI Openness 8.054 *** 6.112 
 
5.563 *** 4.817 * 7.89 
 
26.016 * 
 
(1.934) 
 
(6.353) 
 
(1.211) 
 
(1.927) 
 
(10.036) 
 
(10.692) 
 Trade Openness 447.371 *** 495.886 *** 532.907 *** 575.656 *** 415.51 *** 18.429 
 
 
(131.817) 
 
(124.987) 
 
(60.082) 
 
(60.569) 
 
(87.372) 
 
(142.367) 
 Credit 10.292 *** 7.502 *** 6.158 *** 6.204 *** 10.01 *** 15.441 *** 
 
(1.892) 
 
(1.226) 
 
(0.861) 
 
(0.934) 
 
(1.329) 
 
(2.155) 
 Top Corp. Tax 589.219 
 
1107.625 * 145.909 
 
521.731 
 
621.044 
 
108.236 
 
 
(832.458) 
 
(467.539) 
 
(329.107) 
 
(335.250) 
 
(409.836) 
 
(532.728) 
 Real Exchange Rate -247.225 *** -247.856 *** -222.361 *** -226.999 *** -232.115 *** -211.403 *** 
 
(27.334) 
 
(18.279) 
 
(8.988) 
 
(9.704) 
 
(12.181) 
 
(14.208) 
 Phone Total -398.495 ** -77.881 
 
-109.216 
 
-184.03 ** -363.172 *** -519.743 *** 
 
(142.184) 
 
(107.651) 
 
(66.579) 
 
(69.860) 
 
(88.856) 
 
(119.219) 
 Investment Treaty -320.954 
 
-486.678 ** -216.456 
 
-244.299 ** -284.009 ** -202.181 
 
 
(242.255) 
 
(176.879) 
 
(113.743) 
 
(77.731) 
 
(95.110) 
 
(113.393) 
 Trade Agreement -330.002 
 
-537.53 
 
-315.669 * -392.908 ** -217.991 
 
-3.027 
 
 
(323.180) 
 
(294.404) 
 
(144.797) 
 
(125.398) 
 
(328.075) 
 
(359.368) 
 NAFTA 3224.103 *** 1989.513 ** 2348.447 *** 2828.374 *** 3761.971 *** 3668.581 ** 
 
(465.592) 
 
(657.682) 
 
(528.031) 
 
(402.896) 
 
(737.612) 
 
(1315.691) 
 New Treaty -1091.75 *** -709.351 *** -903.067 *** -896.571 *** -1112.84 *** -1300.13 *** 
 
(210.264) 
 
(162.038) 
 
(102.143) 
 
(89.415) 
 
(102.402) 
 
(146.179) 
 Old/Renegotiated Treaty -254.603 
 
-295.96 ** -174.168 * -125.905 * -234.021 *** -149.538 
 
 
(132.607) 
 
(103.838) 
 
(68.691) 
 
(64.040) 
 
(69.217) 
 
(92.230) 
 Total # of Tax Treaties 53.959 *** 44.595 *** 44.689 *** 49.143 *** 55.999 *** 60.339 *** 
 
(4.191) 
 
(4.293) 
 
(2.383) 
 
(2.001) 
 
(2.793) 
 
(3.884) 
 Constant -14483.3 *** -15507.9 *** -17432.2 *** -16133.7 *** -14958.3 *** -10562.1 *** 
 
(3217.096) 
 
(1906.472) 
 
(1186.691) 
 
(875.249) 
 
(1378.617) 
 
(2872.246) 
 R2 – pseudo R2 0.498 
 
0.447 
 
0.498 
 
0.524 
 
0.541 
 
0.563 
 N 1193  1193  1193  1193  1193  1193  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
       Fixed-Effects mean estimator robust standard errors in parentheses. Fixed-Effects quantile regression estimates and 
 standard errors, in parentheses, were obtained via bootstrapping with 100repetitions. 
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Table 6: Fixed-Effects Mean Regression 
and Fixed-Effects Quantile Regression Results for Equity Capital, 1982-2007 
  
Mean 
 0.10  
Quantile 
 0.25  
Quantile 
 
Median 
 0.75  
Quantile 
 0.90  
Quantile 
 
Explanatory Variable             
Real Stock (lag) 632.529 *** 291.284 ** 411.73 *** 514.197 *** 553.888 *** 627.533 
 
 
(97.257) 
 
(92.354) 
 
(59.322) 
 
(43.555) 
 
(39.933) 
 
(744.495) 
 Real GDP (lag) -1751.09 *** -1443.44 *** -1847.02 *** -2018.08 *** -1843.79 *** -1633.59 
 
 
(351.175) 
 
(206.598) 
 
(186.770) 
 
(149.447) 
 
(127.470) 
 
(1143.164) 
 Size Similarity -33915 *** -36227.3 *** -33513.9 *** -33428.1 *** -34026 *** -35299.1 *** 
 
(2009.687) 
 
(2531.275) 
 
(1188.897) 
 
(1126.517) 
 
(1129.977) 
 
(8117.946) 
 Population -3979.79 *** -3946.14 *** -3648.79 *** -3537.85 *** -3759.81 *** -4010.16 *** 
 
(328.899) 
 
(166.852) 
 
(164.034) 
 
(152.811) 
 
(149.146) 
 
(482.310) 
 FDI Openness 5.082 
 
6.022 *** 4.44 ** 5.328 
 
4.906 
 
3.26 
 
 
(2.687) 
 
(1.533) 
 
(1.541) 
 
(2.820) 
 
(7.002) 
 
(7.272) 
 Trade Openness -306.447 
 
166.001 
 
39.6 
 
-62.789 
 
-213.274 * -448.581 * 
 
(183.839) 
 
(149.248) 
 
(81.610) 
 
(90.924) 
 
(93.669) 
 
(222.416) 
 Credit 26.356 *** 19.662 *** 17.743 *** 22.047 *** 24.017 *** 29.62 *** 
 
(2.764) 
 
(2.997) 
 
(1.645) 
 
(1.613) 
 
(1.959) 
 
(6.599) 
 Top Corp. Tax -1842.24 
 
-1360.92 
 
-2400.18 *** -2402.47 *** -1950.8 *** -1887.65 
 
 
(1189.197) 
 
(713.764) 
 
(413.389) 
 
(693.750) 
 
(552.378) 
 
(6103.207) 
 Real Exchange Rate -469.412 *** -488.035 *** -446.912 *** -437.577 *** -455.637 *** -438.651 *** 
 
(40.274) 
 
(21.727) 
 
(16.824) 
 
(15.104) 
 
(20.609) 
 
(19.382) 
 Phone Total 7.325 
 
175.883 
 
402.725 *** 404.438 *** 250.453 * -15.981 
 
 
(211.620) 
 
(130.500) 
 
(112.230) 
 
(95.856) 
 
(103.865) 
 
(535.774) 
 Investment Treaty 37.58 
 
-107.198 
 
-252.428 
 
-37.387 
 
13.655 
 
73.362 
 
 
(373.950) 
 
(358.002) 
 
(235.531) 
 
(153.256) 
 
(165.973) 
 
(442.064) 
 Trade Agreement -973.05 
 
-393.87 
 
-797.553 *** -909.657 * 11.313 
 
-691.349 
 
 
(519.464) 
 
(705.725) 
 
(217.763) 
 
(403.956) 
 
(496.661) 
 
(1042.589) 
 NAFTA 1204.985 
 
970.262 
 
905.283 
 
920.811 
 
1275.054 
 
2854.37 
 
 
(654.936) 
 
(674.250) 
 
(465.247) 
 
(510.234) 
 
(836.894) 
 
(3044.570) 
 New Treaty -1313.09 *** -591.924 
 
-713.864 *** -997.547 *** -1052.43 *** -1275.78 * 
 
(312.883) 
 
(309.026) 
 
(176.067) 
 
(162.706) 
 
(154.134) 
 
(507.393) 
 Old/Renegotiated Treaty -1517.79 *** -1471.94 *** -1293.35 *** -1263.75 *** -1137.52 *** -925.497 
 
 
(188.889) 
 
(269.986) 
 
(119.146) 
 
(113.388) 
 
(104.138) 
 
(474.162) 
 Total # of Tax Treaties 84.134 *** 49.262 *** 64.104 *** 69.19 *** 75.485 *** 85.468 *** 
 
(6.113) 
 
(8.933) 
 
(5.169) 
 
(3.893) 
 
(4.673) 
 
(21.584) 
 Constant 108654.9 *** 101738.5 *** 106607.5 *** 108571.1 *** 108241.8 *** 106945.1 *** 
 
(4689.595) 
 
(3132.347) 
 
(2101.053) 
 
(2037.250) 
 
(1735.575) 
 
(13089.254) 
 R2 – pseudo R2 0.941 
 
0.883 
 
0.884 
 
0.875 
 
0.849 
 
0.810 
 N 944  944  944  944  944  944  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
       Fixed-Effects mean estimator robust standard errors in parentheses. Fixed-Effects quantile regression estimates and 
 standard errors, in parentheses, were obtained via bootstrapping with 100repetitions. 
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Table 7: Fixed-Effects Mean Regression 
and Fixed-Effects Quantile Regression Results for Inter-Company Debt, 1982-2007 
  
Mean 
 0.10  
Quantile 
 0.25  
Quantile 
 
Median 
 0.75  
Quantile 
 0.90  
Quantile 
 
Explanatory Variable             
Real Stock (lag) -368.738 *** -471.317 *** -403.152 *** -325.577 *** -307.242 *** -248.595 *** 
 
(74.383) 
 
(55.937) 
 
(32.977) 
 
(22.133) 
 
(23.817) 
 
(40.655) 
 Real GDP (lag) 1348.817 *** 1282.744 *** 1220.21 *** 1266.842 *** 1312.681 *** 1564.515 *** 
 
(269.149) 
 
(172.468) 
 
(114.044) 
 
(69.903) 
 
(87.815) 
 
(169.667) 
 Size Similarity 4145.027 ** 2357.237 
 
3337.968 *** 3318.541 *** 3727.922 *** 3540.524 *** 
 
(1548.400) 
 
(1236.266) 
 
(653.672) 
 
(532.853) 
 
(823.724) 
 
(1000.351) 
 Population 180.993 
 
355.889 * 310.665 ** 220.526 ** 175.249 * -94.974 
 
 
(253.018) 
 
(172.086) 
 
(119.727) 
 
(71.761) 
 
(84.249) 
 
(159.175) 
 FDI Openness 4.922 * -10.061 
 
-0.241 
 
3.311 
 
15.886 
 
33.127 * 
 
(2.070) 
 
(8.471) 
 
(7.227) 
 
(5.724) 
 
(12.048) 
 
(13.611) 
 Trade Openness 680.504 *** 393.921 * 575.67 *** 538.232 *** 528.008 *** 350.246 ** 
 
(141.139) 
 
(192.909) 
 
(71.474) 
 
(61.882) 
 
(72.802) 
 
(127.209) 
 Credit -5.845 ** -6.335 ** -5.818 *** -3.517 *** -2.088 
 
3.304 
 
 
(2.125) 
 
(2.310) 
 
(1.155) 
 
(0.760) 
 
(1.346) 
 
(2.735) 
 Top Corp. Tax -750.884 
 
-462.761 
 
-274.662 
 
174.489 
 
-183.971 
 
-66.723 
 
 
(916.634) 
 
(448.579) 
 
(291.228) 
 
(273.841) 
 
(289.399) 
 
(489.462) 
 Real Exchange Rate 99.368 ** 78.307 *** 81.868 *** 86.047 *** 106.793 *** 119.516 *** 
 
(30.781) 
 
(11.890) 
 
(9.570) 
 
(6.981) 
 
(9.212) 
 
(12.518) 
 Phone Total -44.892 
 
114.981 
 
98.401 
 
-24.256 
 
-139.987 ** -358.716 *** 
 
(162.779) 
 
(112.916) 
 
(84.218) 
 
(49.790) 
 
(50.670) 
 
(101.882) 
 Investment Treaty 111.705 
 
129.493 
 
81.118 
 
122.134 
 
58.953 
 
251.609 
 
 
(288.187) 
 
(126.530) 
 
(101.722) 
 
(88.151) 
 
(103.885) 
 
(187.497) 
 Trade Agreement 1353.584 *** 705.477 * 1089.465 *** 1078.168 *** 1158.538 * 1816.439 ** 
 
(393.714) 
 
(313.110) 
 
(182.597) 
 
(182.420) 
 
(478.265) 
 
(674.342) 
 NAFTA -103.174 
 
8.555 
 
-308.569 
 
562.731 
 
922.518 
 
884.912 
 
 
(503.042) 
 
(2980.528) 
 
(458.634) 
 
(572.727) 
 
(639.500) 
 
(605.735) 
 New Treaty 133.814 
 
53.452 
 
150.092 
 
77.576 
 
-40.97 
 
-140.377 
 
 
(241.499) 
 
(157.550) 
 
(106.927) 
 
(60.136) 
 
(73.900) 
 
(117.942) 
 Old/Renegotiated Treaty 916.876 *** 556.044 *** 659.467 *** 801.213 *** 981.057 *** 1265.986 *** 
 
(145.562) 
 
(85.884) 
 
(62.295) 
 
(60.178) 
 
(66.358) 
 
(143.647) 
 Total # of Tax Treaties 3.835 
 
4.486 
 
5.425 
 
6.028 ** 6.887 ** 4.797 
 
 
(4.709) 
 
(4.546) 
 
(2.788) 
 
(2.279) 
 
(2.579) 
 
(5.719) 
 Constant -37127 *** -36819.2 *** -35097.4 *** -35064.8 *** -35194.2 *** -37040.2 *** 
 
(3569.838) 
 
(2228.113) 
 
(1445.425) 
 
(901.151) 
 
(1083.168) 
 
(1661.729) 
 R2 – pseudo R2 0.547 
 
0.521 
 
0.577 
 
0.605 
 
0.611 
 
0.558 
 N 946  946  946   946   946   946   
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
       Fixed-Effects mean estimator robust standard errors in parentheses. Fixed-Effects quantile regression estimates and 
 standard errors, in parentheses, were obtained via bootstrapping with 100repetitions. 
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